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PRIVACY OR THE POLLS: PUBLIC VOTER REGISTRATION
LAWS AS A MODERN FORM OF VOTE DENIAL
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INTRODUCTION
On May 11, 2017, President Donald J. Trump signed an executive
order establishing the Presidential Advisory Commission on Elec-
tion Integrity (PACEI), with the mission to “study the registration
and voting processes used in Federal elections.”1 Pursuant to this
mission, Vice Chair of the Commission, Kansas Secretary of State
Kris Kobach, sent out letters to state election officials soliciting all
“publicly available voter roll data,” including all registrants’ full
first and last names, middle names or initials, addresses, dates of
birth, political party, last four digits of Social Security numbers if
available, voter history from 2006 onward, information regarding
any felony convictions, voter registration in another state, and
military status.2 The requests were met with fierce public backlash
from both citizens3 and state officials,4 with as many as fourteen
states refusing to comply with the Commission’s request,5 ulti-
mately forcing the Commission to dissolve due to sheer lack of state
compliance.6
1. Exec. Order No. 13799, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,389 (May 11, 2017).
2. Cobun Keegan, Trump’s Voter Data Request Tests State Public Data Rules, INT’L ASS’N
PRIVACY PROFS. (July 7, 2017), https://iapp.org/news/a/trumps-voter-data-request-tests-state-
public-data-rules/ [https://perma.cc/TZ97-3F27]; see also Letter from Kris W. Kobach, Vice
Chair, PACEI, to Hon. Elaine Marshall, Secretary of State, North Carolina (June 28, 2017),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3881856-Correspondence-PEIC-Letter-to-North-
Carolina.html [https://perma.cc/J7TA-ALKV].
3. See KUSA Staff, 3,700 Colorado Voters Withdrew Registration Since State's Decision
to Comply With Voter Commission, 9NEWS (July 17, 2017), https://www.9news.com/
article/news/local/next/3700-colorado-voters-withdrew-registration-since-states-decision-to-
comply-with-voter-commission/457425914 [https://perma.cc/RK47-EDPC] (reporting that 3738
voters withdrew their registrations, and 200 voters became confidential, after Colorado
announced it would comply with the PACEI request).
4. See, e.g., Letter from Twenty-Five U.S. Senators to the PACEI (July 6, 2017),
https://epic.org/privacy/voting/pacei/senators-letter-to-commission-070617.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8DB7-3ATB]; Letter from Seventy-Three U.S. House Members to the PACEI (July 18,
2017), https://epic.org/privacy/voting/pacei/house-members-letter-to-commission-071817.pdf
[https://perma.cc/28UL-MYDU].
5. See Mark Berman & John Wagner, Why Almost Every State Is Partially or Fully
Rebuffing Trump’s Election Commission, WASH. POST (July 5, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/07/05/most-states-are-now-partially-or-fully-refusing-to-
hand-over-data-to-trumps-voter-fraud-commission/ [https://perma.cc/Q3WG-N5UV].
6. See Press Release, Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary on the
Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.white
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Although many citizens may be glad that their information will
not be disclosed to the Trump administration, the uproar over the
PACEI request suggests that many citizens are unaware of the
already public nature of their voter registration data.7 PACEI did
not require states to submit any information beyond that which is
already publicly available.8 Currently, “[a]ll 50 states and the
District of Columbia provide access to voter information.”9 Just as
citizens and representatives strongly opposed disclosing voter infor-
mation to the federal government, many voters express similar
opposition to forfeiting their privacy to the public.10 Representatives
and public officials are becoming increasingly aware of constituents’
privacy concerns and the negative effect that public record laws
have on voter registration. Connecticut State Senator Paul Doyle
said: “My constituent told me that they were going to take them-
selves off the voter list and de-register because of their information
being available online.”11 The Supervisor of Elections for Marion
County, Florida, Wesley Wilcox, noted a similar response from
Florida constituents: “As a result of th[e] unintended impact of the
‘Public Records Law’, some voters are turned off to voting and have
even requested to be removed from the voter registration rolls and
surrender their right to vote in exchange for additional protection
of their privacy.”12 State legislatures have responded to such con-
cerns; in 2016, there were at least thirteen bills proposed in eight
house.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-presidential-advisory-commission-
election-integrity/ [https://perma.cc/VE2W-DMXN].
7. See Keegan, supra note 2.
8. See id.
9. It’s a Presidential Election Year: Do You Know Where Your Voter Records Are? 66
CANVASS 1 (Feb. 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/Documents/Elections/The_Canvass_February_
2016_66.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BY2-RZAX] [hereinafter NCSL]. Individual states differ in
regard to what information is available, who may access it, and what voter data may be used
for. See infra Part II.
10. See Why Are Millions of Citizens Not Registered to Vote? PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS
(June 21, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2017/06/
why-are-millions-of-citizens-not-registered-to-vote [https://perma.cc/9WP7-MYGK] (11 percent
of unregistered individuals did not register due to privacy concerns).
11. See NCSL, supra note 9, at 3.
12. Wesley Wilcox, Editorial: Voter Privacy Concerns Under Florida’s Public Records Law,
VOTEMARION (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.votemarion.com/Portals/Marion/Documents/DPT-
Outreach/20170420_VoterInfoPublicRecord.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8DS-TXGG].
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states that dealt with the distribution and availability of voter
information.13
There are legitimate and compelling reasons that eligible voters
might be concerned about the public disclosure of their registration
information.14 Consequently, publicizing voter registration presents
the risk that, when forced to choose between protecting their privacy
and registering to vote, some voters choose not to register;15 the
unacceptable consequence being that eligible citizens are left unable
to exercise their right to vote. This Note will argue that state dis-
closure of voter registration information as public record operates
as a form of vote denial by conditioning voter registration on the
public disclosure of a voter’s registration information. This dis-
closure threatens to decrease the number of eligible citizens who
register to vote and consequently prevent eligible citizens from
exercising their constitutional right to vote. This Note will then pro-
pose that Congress model a reform for voter registration laws after
the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO VOTER
REGISTRATION
The right to vote is well established as imperative to American
democracy,16 yet it is important to recognize the somewhat obvious
fact that registering to vote is a crucial first step to citizens exer-
cising their right to vote.17 This Part will cover how barriers to
voting are detrimental to the functioning of representative democ-
racy and why, by extension, barriers to registration warrant atten-
tion and concern. This Part will first acknowledge the impact of
historical barriers to voting and how modern barriers to voter regis-
tration continue to affect democracy. This Part will then address
13. See NCSL, supra note 9, at 3.
14. See infra Part III.B.1-3.
15. See Why Are Millions of Citizens Not Registered to Vote?, supra note 10.
16. The right to vote is protected in the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX,
XXVI, and further affirmed by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
17. See Voter Registration, NCSL (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-
and-campaigns/voter-registration.aspx [https://perma.cc/C6TN-2B3Y] (“In 49 states, an eli-
gible citizen must be registered to vote. North Dakota does not require voter registration
ahead of an election—eligible citizens can simply appear at the polls with required
identification and be permitted to vote.”).
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modern efforts to improve ease of voter registration, specifically the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993.
A. Historical Barriers to Voting
American citizens have not always universally had, or been able
to effectively exercise, a right to vote.18 In drafting the U.S. Consti-
tution, the Founding Fathers did not grant an affirmative right to
vote to anyone.19 Rather, the Constitution left suffrage decisions to
the individual states.20 For nearly one hundred years of U.S. history,
most states granted only white, land-owning men over the age of
twenty-one the right to vote.21
Even as states began eliminating the requirement of property
ownership, large segments of the population—including women,
African Americans, and Native Americans—remained barred from
voting.22 In 1870, after the Civil War, Congress extended the right
to vote to nonwhite men by passing the Fifteenth Amendment,
which prohibited denying a citizen the right to vote on the basis of
race.23 In practice, however, states largely ignored and circumvented
the Fifteenth Amendment for many years.24
The spike in African American voter registration numbers that
resulted from the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment triggered a
shift from express vote denial to indirect forms of disenfranchise-
18. See Sean Illing, Why the Right to Vote Is Not Enshrined in the Constitution, VOX (Oct.
23, 2018, 10:24 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/9/17/17842890/constitution-day-votingrights-
gerrymandering-lichtman [https://perma.cc/3PSA-FHDL].
19. See id.
20. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
21. See TEACHING ELECTIONS IN WASHINGTON STATE 8, OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE,
https://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/mock/teachers%20guide%20curriculum%2010.08.
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/GPT6-JCX6].
22. See Who Got the Right to Vote When? A History of Voting Rights in America, AL
JAZEERA (2016), https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2016/us-elections-2016-who-can-vote/
index.html [https://perma.cc/X8CR-TUAU].
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. The Fifteenth Amendment marked an important step in
expanding voting rights to include African American men, however, women and Native
Americans remained unable to vote until the 1920s. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; Indian
Citizenship Act, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
24. See Richard H. Pildes & Bradley A. Smith, Common Interpretation: The Fifteenth
Amendment, CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpre-
tation/amendment-xv/interps/141 [https://perma.cc/99WQ-QPNH].
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ment.25 In 1890 (during what would become known as the Era of
Disenfranchisement), states began adopting laws that made it
difficult for African Americans to vote.26 These laws implemented
discriminatory voting qualifications, such as literacy tests, poll
taxes, and proof of good character.27 African Americans also faced
violence and intimidation tactics aimed at keeping them from the
polls.28
These indirect methods of disenfranchisement effectively kept
African American voting levels extremely low.29 In Louisiana, from
1896 to 1904, African American registration numbers decreased by
96 percent.30 Similar drops in African American registration rates
were seen across the southern states during the Era of Disenfran-
chisement: Alabama’s numbers fell from 140,000 to 3742, South
Carolina’s numbers fell from 92,081 to 2823, and Mississippi’s
numbers fell from 52,705 to 3573.31 Consequently, by 1965, even
predominately African American cities such as Selma, Alabama,
had voter rolls that were 99 percent white.32 It was not until 1965,
with the passage of the Voting Rights Act, that discriminatory
voting practices such as poll taxes and literacy tests were officially
banned by the federal government.33
B. Modern Voter Registration Barriers
Despite the elimination of legal barriers to voting, the right to
vote is still hindered by new, more obscure barriers.34 Voter ID
laws, voter roll purges, political and racial gerrymandering, and
25. See John Lewis & Archie E. Allen, Black Voter Registration Efforts in the South, 48
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 105, 105-07 (1972).
26. See id. at 107.
27. See id. at 107-08.
28. See Who Got the Right to Vote When?, supra note 22.
29. See Lewis & Allen, supra note 25, at 107.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Stewart J. Guss, Your Right to Vote: A Brief History, HG LEGAL RES.,
https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/your-right-to-vote-a-brief-history-18535 [https://perma.cc/
DRX4-4696].
33. See Lewis & Allen, supra note 25, at 113.
34. See Illing, supra note 18.
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felon disenfranchisement all threaten to suppress voters and change
election outcomes.35
The controversy surrounding voter ID laws in Wisconsin high-
lights how modern barriers to voter registration threaten to affect
democracy. In 2016, Wisconsin implemented a strict voter ID law
that left 300,000 voters (9 percent of Wisconsin’s electorate) without
an eligible form of ID.36 As a result, Wisconsin’s voter turnout in the
2016 presidential election was reduced by an estimated 200,000
votes.37 Decreasing voter turnout by this amount can be politically
decisive, considering 2016 presidential candidate Donald Trump
won Wisconsin by a mere 22,748 votes.38
Beyond affecting sheer voting numbers, barriers to voter registra-
tion can also affect voter diversity and equality in political represen-
tation.39 Studies estimate that, after implementing stricter voter ID
laws, Wisconsin’s electorate was 6.1 percent more Republican and
5.7 percent less Democrat than the group of 200,000 “lost voters.”40
Wisconsin’s electorate may have also become less racially diverse,
with an estimated 3.7 percent more white voters and 3.8 percent
fewer African American voters than the group of “lost voters.”41
Although studies are mixed as to whether voter ID laws have an
impact on voter turnout and how much of an effect,42 any election
law that may negatively impact equal representation in elections
warrants attention and concern.
C. National Voter Registration Act of 1993
In passing the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA),
supporters recognized barriers to registration as the most impor-
tant factor contributing to low voter turnout rates.43 The NVRA
35. See id.
36. See Ari Berman, Wisconsin’s Voter-ID Law Suppressed 200,000 Votes in 2016, NATION
(May 9, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/wisconsins-voter-id-law-suppressed-200000-
votes-trump-won-by-23000/ [https://perma.cc/V25X-LFXH].
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See 136 CONG. REC. H254 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1990) (statement of Rep. Swift).
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sought to bolster voter turnout by increasing the ease of voter
registration, explicitly acknowledging that “unfair registration laws
and procedures can have a direct and damaging effect on voter
participation in elections for Federal office.”44
Recognizing that voter registration is a critical first step to exer-
cising the right to vote remains as important today as it was in
1993. Statistics show that once people are registered, they are likely
to turn out to vote.45 In the 2016 presidential election, over 87
percent of registered voters actually voted.46 However, only 70 per-
cent of American citizens were registered.47 Eleven percent of
unregistered eligible citizens reported that they did not want to
register due to privacy or security reasons.48
II. CURRENT STATE LAWS GOVERNING ACCESS TO VOTER
REGISTRATION INFORMATION
Under the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), states are
required to maintain “a single, uniform, official, centralized, in-
teractive computerized statewide voter registration list.”49 States
use these voter registration databases to manage voter rolls, and
the databases serve important administrative functions.50 Beyond
internal state use, however, all fifty states and the District of Co-
lumbia also allow some level of access to voter information.51
Individual states vary in regard to what information is disclosed as
44. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, § 2(a)(3), 107 Stat. 77.
45. See, e.g., 136 Cong. Rec. H 254; Voting and Registration in the Election of November
2016, Table 1, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 2017), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-
series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-580.html [https://perma.cc/78YW-P66F].
46. See Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2016, supra note 45 (reporting
157,596,000 U.S. citizens eighteen and older as registered to vote and 137,537,000 citizens as
having voted).
47. See id.
48. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
49. Help America Vote Act, Pub. L. No. 107-252, § 303(a)(1)(A), 116 Stat. 1666, 1708
(2002). The one exception is North Dakota, which was exempted from certain provisions of
HAVA and does not formally require voter registration. N.D. Cent. Code § 16.1-02-01 (2020).
However, North Dakota maintains a “central voter file” containing much of the same infor-
mation as the voter registration databases of other states. See id. §§ 16.1-02-01, 16.1-02-12.
50. See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., IMPROVING STATE VOTER REGISTRATION
DATABASES 3-13 (2010).
51. See NCSL, supra note 9, at 1.
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public record,52 who can access this information,53 and what the
information can be used for.54 Some states also provide exemptions
from the public disclosure of information for registrants meeting
specific criteria.55 This Part provides an overview of current state
laws governing voter registration information and illustrates the
degree of disparity that exists between how states treat voter
registration information.
A. What Information Is a Public Record?
Federal standards establish some degree of national consistency
as to what basic information is collected upon voter registration in
every state.56 Yet, how this information is treated once it is collected
varies dramatically from state to state.57
Almost all states provide registered voters’ names upon request.58
Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia disclose voter history
as public record—meaning that they do not disclose who a person
voted for, but only whether a person voted and in which elections.59
Thirteen states place no official restrictions on what information is
available to the public.60 One such state that allows almost unre-
stricted access to voter data is Alabama, where a voter’s full name,
active or inactive voter status, address, phone number, date of birth,
date of voter registration, last election voted in, complete voter
history, race, and gender are all available to the general public.61
52. See infra Part II.A.
53. See infra Part II.B.
54. See infra Part II.C.
55. See infra Part II.D.
56. See Keegan, supra note 2 (“HAVA includes a requirement to collect from registered
voters either a state driver’s license number or the last four digits of an SSN.... [T]he National
Voter Registration Act of 1993 ... requires that states accept a standardized federal voter
registration form.... [that] includes blanks for a voter’s full date of birth, ID number and
signature.”).
57. See generally Michael P. McDonald, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://electproject.org/
[https://perma.cc/3VKU-WKU4] (reporting the availability of voter data for all fifty states and
the District of Columbia).
58. See NCSL, supra note 9, at 1.
59. See id. (noting that the one exception is Rhode Island, which does not disclose voter
history).
60. Id.
61. See Leada Gore, Name, Birthday, Voting History? It's All Available-For a Price-From
Alabama Secretary of State's Office, AL (July 5, 2017), https://www.al.com/news/2017/07/
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Other states place statutory limitations on what voter information
is available to the general public. In California, for example, a
voter’s home address, telephone number, email address, and pre-
cinct number are “confidential” and are not disclosed to the general
public.62 States used to disclose Social Security numbers in public
voter files,63 but no longer do so64 because such disclosures raised
serious privacy concerns.65
B. Who Can Access Voter Information?
In addition to differences in what information people can access,
who can access it also varies by state.66 Eleven states restrict access
to voter information to that state’s residents.67 Seven states limit
access to other registered voters.68 Eleven states do not allow the
general public to access voter information at all.69 However, restrict-
ing public access to voter information does not mean that voter data
is completely free from disclosure. All states allow candidates run-
ning for elected office and political parties to access voter records,70
which includes access to information that is otherwise considered
confidential and not disclosed to the general public.71 Six states
allow similar exemptions for nonprofit organizations, and nine
states also allow exemptions for researchers.72
name_birthday_voting_history_i.html [https://perma.cc/GT83-JY79].
62. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254.4(a) (2015). Note that this restriction applies to access by the
general public only and is subject to statutory exemption. See infra Part II.B; see also CAL.
ELEC. CODE § 2194(a)(3) (2018) (providing that confidential voter data can be disclosed “to any
candidate for federal, state, or local office ... any committee ... and to any person for election,
scholarly, journalistic, or political purposes”).
63. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.1-23(8), 24.1-56 (repealed 1993).
64. See Keegan, supra note 2.
65. See Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1353-54 (4th Cir. 1993).
66. See NCSL, supra note 9, at 2. See generally McDonald, supra note 57 (reporting which
entities have access to voter data for all fifty states and the District of Columbia).
67. See NCSL, supra note 9, at 2.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2194(a)(1) (2018).
72. NCSL, supra note 9, at 2.
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C. How Voter Data Can Be Used
Few states place restrictions on what available voter registration
information can be used for. Most states allow voter data to be used
for “noncommercial purposes,” which means any use other than
selling a product or service.73 Some states limit the use of voter data
to “political purposes;” however, state statutes often do not define
what constitutes a political purpose.74 Regardless of restrictions,
once voter information is released it becomes difficult for the state
to control its use.75
D. Statutory Exemptions
Most states allow registering voters to apply for an exemption
from the public disclosure of their voter information, granted the
registrant meets certain statutory criteria.76 Such exemptions ac-
commodate individuals who would face a known safety risk if their
personal information were made public record, such as victims of
domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking.77 At least twenty-nine
states prevent the public disclosure of voter information for citizens
who are members of the state’s Address Confidentiality Program.78
For victims not belonging to their state’s Address Confidentiality
Program, or in states that do not have such programs, some state
statutes require victims of domestic violence seeking a public record
exemption to demonstrate a safety risk by obtaining a court order
requiring their registration record not be made available to the
public,79 obtaining official verification that a crime has occurred,80
73. Id.
74. IOWA CODE § 48A.39 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-2-138(d)(1) (2019).
75. See NCSL, supra note 9, at 2.
76. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
77. See NCSL, supra note 9, at 2.
78. See Voter Registration & Privacy, TECH. SAFETY (2016), https://www.techsafety.org/
voter-registration-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/SFL3-SCR9]. Address Confidentiality Programs
give victims a legal substitute address to use in place of their physical address whenever
an address is required by public agencies. Address Confidentiality Programs, STALKING
RES. CTR., http://victimsofcrime.org/our-programs/stalking-resource-center/help-for-victims/
address-confidentiality-programs [https://perma.cc/6R78-ZEGW].
79. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-153 (2019); 15 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 1303(a)
(2011); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-508(2) (2017).
80. See FLA. STAT. § 119.071(2)(j)(1) (2019).
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having a court-issued protective order,81 or furnishing a signed
statement that the registrant is in fear for his or her safety due to
threats or stalking and evidence that the registrant filed a com-
plaint with law enforcement against the culpable person.82
Some states also allow public record exemptions for select “high
risk” professionals, including justices and judges, law enforcement
officers, state employees and their families, and active and retired
military members.83 States that allow sixteen- and seventeen-year-
old voters to preregister differ in how they treat minors’ voter
information. Some states keep minors’ information off of public re-
cord lists by designating preregistered voters as “pending,” and thus
not disclosed on the public list of “active” voters.84 Other states
make preregistered voters’ information a matter of public record the
same as all other voters.85
III. PUBLIC VOTER REGISTRATION LAWS AS A MODERN FORM OF
VOTE DENIAL
The modernization of the election process and voting administra-
tion, largely brought about by the HAVA,86 has led to new and often
less immediately apparent forms of disenfranchisement. No longer
are voters faced with explicit disenfranchisement methods, such as
poll taxes and literacy tests.87 Today, practices such as racial gerry-
mandering88 and voter identification laws89 threaten to deny voters
81. See VA. CODE ANN. §  24.2-418(B)(2) (2019).
82. See id. § 24.2-418(B)(3).
83. See Brevard County Supervisor of Elections, Request a Public Records Exemption,
VOTEBREVARD, https://www.votebrevard.com/voter-information/request-a-public-
records-exemption [https://perma.cc/DFS8-YZT2].
84. See NCSL, supra note 9, at 2-3.
85. See id.
86. Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).
87. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (“No voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or
applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color.”).
88. See, e.g., Patricia Okonta, Race-Based Political Exclusion and Social Subjugation:
Racial Gerrymandering as a Badge of Slavery, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 254, 269-70
(2018).
89. See, e.g., Richard W. Trotter, Vote of Confidence: Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board, Voter Identification Laws, and the Suppression of a Structural Right, 16 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 515, 545-46 (2013).
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a fair and equal voice in elections.90 These modern mechanisms do
not explicitly deny citizens the right to vote; however, as applied
they present the risk of effectively diluting voter representation or
barring equal access to the polls.91 State public record laws present
a similar risk. Although publicizing voter registration information
does not outwardly deny any citizen’s right to vote, these laws can
impose a barrier to registering to vote that subsequently prevents
eligible citizens from exercising their right to vote.92
This Part analyzes the constitutionality of public voter registra-
tion information laws. Many courts have upheld voter registration
laws requiring registrants to disclose information to the state.93
However, conditioning the right to vote on citizens disclosing their
personal registration information to the public is a distinctly dif-
ferent issue. Requiring citizens to disclose identification information
to the state in order to register to vote is a minimal burden that
serves a legitimate state interest of verifying voter eligibility and
preventing fraud.94 Disclosing this information to the public, on the
other hand, is a severe burden that is not necessary to safeguard
voters or protect the integrity of the election process.
This Part first assesses the applicable standard of review, then
proceeds to identify and evaluate the burden that public voter
registration information laws impose on voters and the democratic
process. Based on the burden, this Part then applies the standard
90. See, e.g., Gilda R. Daniels, A Vote Delayed Is a Vote Denied: A Preemptive Approach
to Eliminating Election Administration Legislation That Disenfranchises Unwanted Voters,
47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 57, 57-59 (2008) (discussing the impact of modern disen-
franchisement methods).
91. See id. at 66-69.
92. See infra Part III.B.
93. See McKay v. Thompson, 226 F.3d 752, 756-57 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that a
Tennessee law requiring disclosure of a Social Security number to the state to register to vote
did not unconstitutionally burden the right to vote); Kemp v. Tucker, 396 F. Supp. 737 (M.D.
Pa. 1975), aff'd 423 U.S. 803 (1975) (per curiam) (holding that a Pennsylvania law requiring
a registrant to disclose his or her race when registering to vote was constitutional); State ex
rel. Klein v. Hillenbrand, 130 N.E. 29, 32 (Ohio 1920) (holding that an Ohio law requiring a
registrant to disclose his or her age did not deny the constitutional right to vote).
94. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity of Statute Requiring Proof and Disclosure of
Information as Condition of Registration to Vote, 48 A.L.R. 6th 181 (2009) (“[C]ourts often
reasoned that far from impeding the right to vote, the registration statutes seeking certain
information from applicants were designed to, and actually did, improve the voting process
by eliminating fraud and abuses.”).
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of review, and argues that publicizing voter registration information
is overly burdensome and does not withstand exacting scrutiny.
A. A Burden-Based Standard of Review
In cases involving voter qualifications and ballot access, the
Supreme Court has traditionally applied strict scrutiny, requiring
that “restrictions on the right to vote must serve a compelling state
interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that state interest.”95 Yet
when a “burdensome condition” is placed on an individual exercising
the right to vote, as opposed to an “absolute denial” of the right to
vote, the Court is less clear in identifying whether strict scrutiny or
rational basis review should apply.96
Anderson v. Celebrezze established a general balancing test that
calls for weighing the injury to voters’ rights against the asserted
state interest.97 The Court recognized that some state restrictions
on voters’ rights are necessary “as a practical matter” to regulate
and achieve orderly, fair elections, and stated that reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions could generally by justified by the
state’s “important regulatory interests.”98 However, the Court qual-
ified that, “even when pursuing a legitimate interest, a State may
not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally pro-
tected liberty.”99
The Court expounded on the Anderson balancing test in Burdick
v. Takushi.100 Burdick “call[ed] for application of a deferential ‘im-
portant regulatory interests’ standard for nonsevere, nondiscrimi-
natory restrictions, reserving strict scrutiny for laws that severely
restrict the right to vote.”101
In response to more recent claims contesting the constitutionality
of state voter identification laws, Crawford v. Marion County
95. See id. (citing Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344, 1352 (4th Cir. 1993)).
96. See Greidinger, 988 F.2d at 1350.
97. 460 U.S. 779, 789 (1983) (challenging a state statutory filing deadline for political
candidates to be placed on the ballot).
98. Id. at 788.
99. Id. at 806 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972)).
100. 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (challenging Hawaii’s prohibition on write-in voting as an
unreasonable burden on citizens’ right to vote).
101. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Election Board confirmed the application of a balancing test, stating
that, however slight the burden may appear, it must be “justified by
relevant and legitimate state interests ‘sufficiently weighty to
justify the limitation.’”102 More specifically addressing state dis-
closure requirements, Doe v. Reed applied a similar balancing test
under “exacting scrutiny” to evaluate the constitutionality of the
public disclosure of petition signatures, holding that the petitioners’
success depended upon demonstrating a resulting harm that out-
weighed the state’s administrative interests.103 Thus, determining
the applicable standard of review depends on first evaluating how
severely the public disclosure of voter registration information
burdens the right to vote.
B. Identifying the Burden: Privacy in the Digital Age
Historically, voter rolls have always been a matter of public
record; however, the nature of public records and the harms stem-
ming from one’s personal identifying information being available to
the public have changed over time.104 As the world grows increas-
ingly connected and digitized, public records have become increas-
ingly public: voter roll information that once required a physical
trip to the board of elections in order to access it is now instantly
available to anyone, anywhere, at the click of a button, on both state
websites and numerous third-party websites.105 This increased ease
of access to public records has exposed voters to new harms not
previously imposed by public voter information laws, such as voter
intimidation, personal safety concerns, and identity theft risks, and
also inflicts broader democratic and societal harms.106
102. Id. at 191 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992)).
103. 561 U.S. 186, 200-02 (2010).
104. See David A. Graham, The Strange Phenomenon of Voter Self-Suppression, ATLANTIC
(July 21, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/the-strange-
phenomenon-of-voter-self-suppression/533766/ [https://perma.cc/7RJ9-D6PG].
105. See id.
106. See id.
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1. Voter Intimidation
Voter intimidation is any conduct that “intimidates or threatens
voters into voting a certain way or refraining from voting.”107 Voter
intimidation is easily spotted when achieved through violence and
threats, yet modern intimidation tactics often take more subtle
forms.108 For example, political organizations have begun utilizing
public voter registration records to obtain registrants’ names and
home addresses in order to send out intimidating—and often overtly
threatening—mailers.
In 2014 in Lee County, Florida, many voters were shaken when
they received letters from a political group called “Citizens for a
Better Florida.”109 The letters urged recipients to vote, but also
included their neighbors’ names and voting records, with an added
threat to include recipients’ names and voting records in future
mailers.110 Lee County Elections Supervisor Sharon Harrington
reported receiving “lot[s] of calls” from very upset voters in response
to the letters.111 New York voters received similarly ominous letters
from The New York State Democratic Committee, reading: “Who
you vote for is your secret.... But whether or not you vote is public
record.”112 The letter went on to suggest that eyes were on recipi-
ents, stating that “[m]any organizations monitor turnout in your
neighborhood and are disappointed by the inconsistent voting of
many of your neighbors,” further threatening that “[w]e will be
reviewing the Kings County official voting records after the up-
coming election to determine whether you joined your neighbors
who voted in 2014.”113
107. WENDY WEISER & VISHAL AGRAHARKAR, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, BALLOT SECURITY
AND VOTER SUPPRESSION: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT THE LAW SAYS 2 (2012).
108. See id. at 7.
109. Betty Parker, An Individual’s Voting History Is Public Record, NEWS-PRESS (Nov. 1,
2014, 10:50 AM), https://www.news-press.com/story/news/politics/betty-parker/2014/11/01/
individuals-voting-history-public-record/18313485/ [https://perma.cc/X4QZ-2RDT].
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. Christopher Robbins, GOTV MOFO: NY Democrats Getting Oddly Threatening Letters
from State Democratic Committee, GOTHAMIST (Oct. 30, 2014, 12:14 PM), https://gothamist.
com/news/gotv-mofo-ny-democrats-getting-oddly-threatening-letters-from-state-democratic-
committee [https://perma.cc/97ZC-85Y3].
113. Id.
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Political organizations are not the only ones guilty of using public
voter records to intimidate voters: Texas Senator Ted Cruz received
harsh backlash for employing the same strategy in his 2016 pres-
idential campaign.114 Senator Cruz’s campaign sent out mailers that
gave recipients a “voting score” from A to F and included the phrase
“official public record” to try to shame Iowa voters for their past
voting participation.115 Paul Pate, the Secretary of State of Iowa,
condemned the mailers because they accused voters of committing
fabricated “voting violation[s]” based on a lack of voting participa-
tion, and recipients of the mailers were equally outraged.116
As concerning as it is that political organizations and candidates
use public records to send mailers of this sort, all state public record
laws allow this practice.117 The political organizations that send
these mailers may claim they have good intentions of increasing
voter turnout;118 however, that does not make it a desirable use of
public information. Similarly, politicians running for elected office
may claim that contacting constituents is necessary for an effective
campaign.119 However, it is the intimidating content and tone of
such mailers, not simply contacting voters or the use of mailers
itself, that runs awry of the “political purposes” for which state
statutes allow politicians and political organizations to use voter roll
information.120
Using public voter registration records to send threatening,
unsolicited mailers harms voters’ confidence in their ability to freely
exercise their right to vote. Some Florida voters contacted their
elections office because receiving an intimidating mailer made them
114. See Sabrina Siddiqui, Cruz Campaign Draws Condemnation for Strategy of Shaming
Iowans to Caucus, GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2016, 8:43 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2016/jan/30/ted-cruz-campaign-voter-violation-grades-caucus [https://perma.cc/PH9C-ESMN].
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
118. See Alan S. Gerber et al., Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-
Scale Field Experiment, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 33, 34-35, 42 (2008) (finding that neighbor
mailers exerting social pressures on citizens to vote increased voter turnout).
119. See Ruth Igielnik et al., Commercial Voter Files and the Study of U.S. Politics:
Demystifying the Digital Databases Widely Used by Political Campaigns 48-49, PEW RES. CTR.
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/2018/02/15/commercial-voter-files-and-
the-study-of-u-s-politics/ [https://perma.cc/E4G5-9ZK8] (discussing how commercial voter files
may facilitate greater turnout in elections).
120. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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fear that the sender knew who they had voted for in the past.121
Other voters were upset that their voter information was publicly
available, a fact previously unknown to them before receiving a
mailer.122 In light of today’s tumultuous political climate, voters may
consider intrusion into their political activities an offensive invasion
and a source of emotional distress.123 This raises the risk that eli-
gible voters will refrain from registering to vote in order to avoid the
burden of being subject to these acts—whether intentional or
not—of political intimidation.
2. Physical Safety Threats
“I have been contacted by female voters concerned for their safety
who, sadly, ask me to remove them from the voter rolls,” reported
Lori Scott, the Brevard County, Florida, Supervisor of Elections.124
Survivors of domestic violence, stalking, sexual assault, or traffick-
ing have serious physical safety concerns implicated by public voter
registration records.125 For these individuals, protecting their per-
sonal information, particularly their addresses, can be a matter of
life or death.126 Attackers can easily use public information in order
to locate, stalk, and physically harm their victims.127 The law al-
ready recognizes the need to limit the availability of personal
information in order to protect individuals’ safety. For example,
there are statutory protections for children’s information on the
Internet128 and limitations on the use of individuals’ Department of
121. See Parker, supra note 109.
122. See Colin Campbell, NC Democratic Party, Sierra Club Try Shaming Tactics to Get
Out the Vote, NEWS & OBSERVER (Oct. 28, 2014, 5:25 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/
news/politics-government/election/article10110254.html [https://perma.cc/T3HZ-QJ4F].
123. See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1166 (2015) (noting that
privacy harms may change based on shifts in social norms and changes in society’s concerns).
124. See Lori Scott, Elections Supervisor: Voter Data Should Not Be Open, FLA. TODAY (Jan.
15, 2016, 3:10 PM), https://www.floridatoday.com/story/opinion/columnists/guest-columns/
2016/01/17/elections-supervisor-voter-data-open/78858530/ [https://perma.cc/9GEU-85TL].
125. See Voter Registration Records & Privacy, NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE (2017).
126. See Ohm, supra note 123, at 1156 (detailing two cases in which stalkers found and
killed the women they were stalking, after obtaining their home or work addresses).
127. See id. at 1148.
128. See Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2018).
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Motor Vehicle (DMV) records.129 Public voter registration records
present another source of personal identifying information that
poses a physical safety threat to registrants.
The real-life consequences of personal information being public
record came to the forefront of the public’s attention in the late
1980s, with the infamous murder of twenty-one-year-old aspiring
Hollywood actress Rebecca Schaeffer.130 In 1989, an obsessed fan
named Robert John Bardo stalked and killed Schaeffer in her Los
Angeles apartment after obtaining her unlisted address from a pri-
vate detective.131 The detective had obtained Schaeffer’s address
from the California DMV.132 At the time, anyone could go into the
California DMV, fill out an information request form, and for as
little as one dollar, be given a driver’s record on the spot.133
Schaeffer’s murder was a catalyst for the passage of the Driver’s
Privacy Protection Act of 1994,134 which limits the DMV’s ability to
disclose a driver’s personal information without the driver’s express
consent.135
Recognizing that offenders often use public information such as
voter and drivers’ license registries to find a victim’s address, thirty-
six states have Address Confidentiality Programs (ACPs)136 and at
least twenty-nine states prevent the public disclosure of voter
information for citizens who are members of the state’s ACP.137
Other states offer statutory exemptions for victims of crimes to have
their voter registration information redacted from public records.138
129. See Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (2012).
130. See Ctr. for Individual Rights v. Chevaldina, No. 16-civ-20905, 2018 WL 1795470, at
*6 n.3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2018).
131. See Frank Wilkins, The Death of Rebecca Schaeffer: The Stalking Death that Changed
the Law, REEL REVS., http://reelreviews.com/shorttakes/shaeffer/shaeffer.htm [https://
perma.cc/LZ9Y-LNUH].
132. ROBERT GELLMAN & PAM DIXON, ONLINE PRIVACY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 144
(2011).
133. See Wilkins, supra note 131.
134. See Chevaldina, 2018 WL 1795470, at *6 n.3.
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)(2) (2012).
136. See Address Confidentiality Programs, supra note 78 (noting that ACPs give victims
a post office box address to use in place of their physical address whenever an address is
required by public agencies).
137. See id.
138. See supra Part II.D.
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The problem with ACPs and current statutory exemptions is that
they are incredibly limited and do not effectively protect all at-risk
voters from harm. A major flaw of ACPs is that an individual must
opt in by submitting an application to the state ACP agency.139
Opting in requires that an individual know they are the target of a
potential threat.140 This leaves anyone who does not know he or she
has been targeted exposed to the risks of their public voter informa-
tion being obtained by someone who intends to cause them harm.141
In addition, statutory exemptions often require a registering voter
to have documentation proving that a crime occurred.142 This is an
unrealistic requirement given that many victims of domestic vio-
lence do not report their abuse, for a variety of reasons including
fear of reprisal from their abuser.143 Thus, victims of unreported
domestic violence or other unreported crimes are not protected by
their states’ statutory exemptions.
The inadequate privacy protections offered to registering voters
leaves two primary concerns: (1) that many unsuspecting voters
will have their voter records used by attackers to locate them and
cause them harm, and (2) that survivors of crimes, who already go
to great lengths to protect their personal information, may not be
able to meet the documentation requirements or may find their
states’ ACP and statutory exemption procedures too complex to
navigate, and thus ultimately decide not to register to vote in order
to avoid threats to their safety.
139. See Carol Lavery, Address Confidentiality Programs Aim to Keep Victims Safe,
STALKING RES. CTR., http://victimsofcrime.org/docs/src/address-confidentiality-programs-aim-
to-keep-victims-safe.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/7ZYN-JDMU].
140. See VOTER INFORMATION WEBSITES STUDY, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N 18,
https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/Voter_Information_Web_Sites_Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FP5U-DPLG].
141. See id.
142. See supra Part II.D.
143. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ
250231, POLICE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 2006-2015, at 3 (2017), https://www.bjs.
gov/content/pub/pdf/prdv0615.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FGW-JYA9] (listing that an estimated
582,000 instances of domestic violence went unreported between 2006 and 2015).
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3. Identity Theft
Brevard County, Florida, Supervisor of Elections Lori Scott re-
ported, “I increasingly hear from voters who are concerned about
Florida’s open access to their personal information.... I hear from
voters concerned about increasing crimes of identity theft.”144 Scott’s
constituents’ concerns are well founded; Florida ranks second in the
United States for states with the most cases of identity theft per
capita.145 Yet identity theft is on the rise throughout the entire
United States. In 2017, 16.7 million Americans were victims of
identity fraud—an 8 percent increase from the previous year—
resulting in over $16.8 billion dollars stolen from consumers.146
Fraudsters mainly target online channels in order to steal victims’
personal information.147 The increased online availability and ease
of online access to voter registration records exposes voter data to
similar risks. Criminals can use a name, address, and date of birth
as a starting point to obtain an individual’s financial records and
other information via “phishing.”148 Phishing is when a scammer
uses fraudulent emails or texts to get a recipient to divulge sensitive
information, such as account numbers, Social Security numbers, or
passwords, as a means to steal the individual’s money or identity.149
4. Democratic Harm
It is universally acknowledged that a well-functioning democracy
depends upon all citizens being equally represented by their govern-
ment.150 Yet in order to be represented, citizens must vote, and in
144. Scott, supra note 124.
145. See Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book 2017: State Rankings: Identity Theft
Reports, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/
commission-staff-reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-2017/state-rankings-id-theft-
reports [https://perma.cc/9892-E79B].
146. See Al Pascual, Kyle Marchini, & Sarah Miller, 2018 Identity Fraud: Fraud Enters a
New Era of Complexity, JAVELIN (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.javelinstrategy.com/coverage-
area/2018-identity-fraud-fraud-enters-new-era-complexity [https://perma.cc/K9L6-HNLM].
147. See id.
148. See VOTER INFORMATION WEBSITES STUDY, supra note 140.
149. See How to Recognize and Avoid Phishing Scams, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 2019),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0003-phishing [https://perma.cc/NG2R-DTBK].
150. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 102
(Currin V. Shields ed., The Liberal Arts Press 5th ed. 1958) (1861) (“The pure idea of
1494 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1473
order to vote, citizens must first be registered.151 Barriers to voter
registration threaten the legitimacy of American democracy by
excluding eligible citizens from participating in America’s decision-
making process, thus resulting in elected bodies that are not ac-
curately representative of the entire population.152 Public voter
registration laws threaten to disproportionately burden and bar two
groups of the population from voting: women and privacy-conscious
citizens.
Public voter registration laws disproportionately burden women
due to physical safety concerns. Eighty-five percent of domestic
violence victims each year are women.153 In addition, women ages
eighteen to thirty-four experience higher rates of domestic violence
than women of other age brackets, and African American women
experience domestic violence at a higher rate than women belonging
to other racial groups.154 Consequently, safety concerns implicated
by public voter registration laws threaten to disproportionately bar
young women, and especially African American women, from being
represented in elections.
Privacy-conscious citizens also compose a portion of the popula-
tion that is burdened by public voter registration laws. A 2015 Pew
Research Center survey found that Americans have strong views
about the importance of privacy: 93 percent of adults responded that
being in control of who can collect information about them is
important to them, and 90 percent said that controlling what
information is collected about them was also important.155 A large
group of Americans already engage in some “privacy-enhancing
measures” to protect their information privacy in their everyday
democracy, according to its definition, is the government of the whole people by the whole
people, equally represented.”).
151. See Voter Registration, supra note 17.
152. See Danielle Root & Liz Kennedy, Increasing Voter Participation in America, CTR. AM.
PROGRESS (July 11, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/
reports/2018/07/11/453319/increasing-voter-participation-america/ [https://perma.cc/6GJW-
Y8BN].
153. SHANNON CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ
239203, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993-2010, at 3 (rev. ed. Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv9310.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4TX-4VH4].
154. See id. at 2.
155. See Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and
Surveillance, PEW RES. CTR. (May 20, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/
americans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-and-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/8YAY-F9M8].
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lives.156 For example, 57 percent of Americans have refused to pro-
vide information about themselves that was not relevant to the
transaction, and 23 percent have decided not to use a website
because it asked for their name.157
Unfortunately, citizens have begun taking similar privacy
measures in response to public voter records. In 2017, 11 percent of
unregistered eligible citizens reported that they did not want to reg-
ister to vote due to privacy or security reasons.158 Awareness of
monitoring also leads to heightened privacy concerns from cit-
izens.159 Consequently, receiving intimidating mailers from political
groups monitoring voter behavior,160 or general increased awareness
of public voter registration information being available to anyone
upon request,161 raises the risk that more and more eligible voters
will begin taking measures to protect their information by not reg-
istering to vote or by removing themselves from the rolls.
By forcing women and privacy-conscious citizens to face barriers
to registering to vote that ultimately prevent them from voting,
public voter registration laws result in an elected government that
does not accurately represent the American citizenry.
5. Societal Harm
Information privacy has traditionally been considered an indi-
vidual concern, but in the modern digital world, privacy concerns
affect everyone and permeate almost every aspect of modern life.162
Thus, in addition to being an individual concern, privacy should also
be recognized as a general societal value and public interest.163 One
way public voter registration laws inflict society-wide harm is by
compromising the relationship that citizens have with their
government.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Why Are Millions of Citizens Not Registered to Vote?, supra note 10.
159. See Madden & Rainie, supra note 155.
160. See supra Part III.B.1.
161. As occurred in response to President Trump’s PACEI requests in 2017. See supra note
7 and accompanying text.
162. See James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2003).
163. See id. at 7.
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Public records reflect the sensitive relationship that citizens have
with their government.164 “Privacy is rooted in the classical liberal
belief in limited government and a general distrust of powerful
institutions.”165 When citizens lose control over personal informa-
tion, there is a recognized “loss of dignity, autonomy, or respect for
the individual.”166 Additionally, government amassment of informa-
tion about people creates public anxiety of being monitored, often
resulting in people altering their behavior.167 The potential harm of
public voter information is that citizens will alter their behavior by
choosing to not register to vote.168
While many citizens understand that information access can
produce benefits such as a more efficient government,169 most
Americans are not confident in the government’s ability to ade-
quately safeguard their information and protect their privacy
interests.170 Survey results reveal that 94 percent of Americans are
not very confident that government agencies can keep their in-
formation private and secure.171 Recognizing that privacy plays a
“crucial role in protecting diversity of thought and equality,”172 we
must similarly recognize that privacy in voter records is crucial to
protect diversity and equality in the registration and turnout of
American voters.
C. State Interests
After identifying how public voter registration laws burden
citizens’ right to vote, the next step is to identify potential state
interests that could justify the disclosure and dissemination of voter
information to the public.173 Potential state interests regarding
164. See Ohm, supra note 123, at 1160.
165. Nehf, supra note 162, at 71.
166. Id. at 70.
167. See Ohm, supra note 123, at 1165.
168. See id.
169. See Nehf, supra note 162, at 4.
170. See Madden & Rainie, supra note 155.
171. Id.
172. Ohm, supra note 123, at 1165.
173. See supra Part III.A.
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public voter registration laws include preventing voter fraud and
improving administrative efficiency.174
Courts recognize that preventing voter fraud is an important
state interest.175 However, the fact that voter fraud is actually quite
rare176 makes the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud less
compelling. A comprehensive 2014 study found only thirty-one
potentially credible incidents of voter fraud in the entire United
States over the course of fourteen years out of a total of over one
billion ballots cast.177 In the 2016 presidential election, more than
135 million ballots were cast yet only four cases of in-person voter
fraud were documented.178 In addition to in-person voter fraud,
other forms of voter fraud, such as double voting via absentee
ballots or providing fraudulent registration information, are simi-
larly rare and such claims are often unsubstantiated.179 A 2007
Brennan Center report on voter fraud found that most purported
incidents of fraud actually resulted from mistakes by state election
workers—such as clerical, typographical, or data matching errors—
not actual fraud on the part of voters.180 So although voter fraud
does occur, it is so exceedingly rare that the state interest at issue
is weak at best.
174. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 196 (2008).
175. See, e.g., id. (“There is no question about the legitimacy or importance of the State's
interest in counting only the votes of eligible voters.”); Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344,
1354 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Unquestionably, [the state] has a compelling state interest in pre-
venting voter fraud.”).
176. See Debunking the Voter Fraud Myth, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.brennancenter.org/debunking-voter-fraud-myth [https://perma.cc/PMR2-3P4J].
In assessing Indiana’s state interest in preventing voter fraud, the Supreme Court recognized
that there was “no evidence of any [in-person voter impersonation] fraud actually occurring
in Indiana at any time in its history.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 194.
177. Justin Levitt, A Comprehensive Investigation of Voter Impersonation Finds 31 Credible
Incidents Out of One Billion Ballots Cast, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/08/06/a-comprehensive-investigation-of-voter-impersonation-
finds-31-credible-incidents-out-of-one-billion-ballots-cast/ [https://perma.cc/W8M8-BWEH].
178. Philip Bump, There Have Been Just Four Documented Cases of Voter Fraud in the
2016 Election, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/
wp/2016/12/01/0-000002-percent-of-all-the-ballots-cast-in-the-2016-election-were-fraudulent/
[https://perma.cc/3ZK8-VUZM].
179. See JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE TRUTH ABOUT VOTER FRAUD, BREN-
NAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 12-22 (2007), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/
The%20Truth%20About%20Voter%20Fraud.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2C8-8X3F].
180. See id. at 7-8.
1498 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1473
A second potential state interest is that public voter registration
records improve administrative efficiency. Allowing access to voter
registration information, particularly via websites with voter reg-
istration lookup, means citizens can easily check to see if they are
registered to vote.181 “Several officials commented that voter in-
formation websites have reduced calls to the election department on
Election Day.”182 The traffic and frequency of look ups on voter
registration websites also suggests that such websites are popular
and citizens benefit from them.183 Convenience for its own sake is
not, however, a particularly weighty state interest. In recognizing
administrative efficiency as a “proper state interest worthy of
cognizance in constitutional adjudication,” the Court firmly qual-
ified that “the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency.”184
D. A Balancing Act: Applying the Standard of Review
Having identified both the burdens imposed on citizens’ right to
vote and potential state interests, evaluating the constitutionality
of public voter registration laws requires weighing the injury to
voters’ rights against the state interest.185 This Part argues that the
burden imposed on voters’ rights by public voter registration laws
warrants “exacting scrutiny,” and that public voter registration laws
are not substantially related to the alleged state interests to justify
infringing on citizens’ constitutional right to vote.
Establishing the burdens imposed on voters by public voter
registration records illuminates which “balancing test” standard of
review should apply. Although this Note argues that public voter
registration laws operate as a restriction on the right to vote, public
voter registration laws are fundamentally state disclosure require-
ments, rendering this argument most analogous to First Amend-
ment challenges to state disclosure requirements, as in Doe v.
Reed.186 Although this Note focuses on the constitutional right to
181. See VOTER INFORMATION WEBSITES STUDY, supra note 140, at 2.
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
185. See supra Part III.A.
186. See 561 U.S. 186, 194 (2010).
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vote, not a First Amendment right, both claims challenge disclosure
requirements in the electoral context and assert similar privacy and
safety harms incurred by citizens.187
In Doe v. Reed, the Court followed a series of precedents that
applied “exacting scrutiny,” a standard requiring “a ‘substantial re-
lation’ between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently impor-
tant’ governmental interest.”188 “To withstand [exacting] scrutiny,
‘the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the serious-
ness of the ... burden on’” the individual’s constitutional right.189
The analysis begins with evaluating the relation between public
voter registration laws and government interests of preventing voter
fraud and improving administrative efficiency. Public voter regis-
tration laws are not substantially related to preventing voter fraud,
because they do not effectively serve that purpose, and there are
other, more effective and less burdensome means of preventing
voter fraud.190 State collection and internal use of voter information
is necessary to keep an accurate list of eligible voters and prevent
voter fraud;191 dissemination of voter information to the public, on
the other hand, only purports to prevent voter fraud by allowing
private citizens to challenge voter eligibility.192 Although vote chal-
lenging has a long history in the United States, modern election
reforms render the archaic practice of private citizens policing voter
eligibility ineffective and unnecessary.193 “Most [voter] challenger
laws pre-date major reforms in election administration” such as the
use of computerized voter registration systems.194 Modern election
reforms have “significantly diminish[ed] the need for poll challeng-
ers” by “largely eliminat[ing] the very problem that challengers are
187. See id. at 193, 196.
188. Id. at 196 (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366-67
(2010)).
189. Id. (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008)).
190. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 779, 789 (1983).
191. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
192. See NICOLAS RILEY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, VOTER CHALLENGERS 1, 4 (2012).
193. See id. at 7. It should also be noted that, while voter challenge laws were enacted for
the alleged purpose of preventing election fraud, the legislative history in some states sug-
gests that such laws were actually enacted with the discriminatory purpose of suppressing
minority voters. See id. This begs the question of whether voter challenging is a valid practice
we want to continue to uphold in U.S. elections, or merely a reflection of historically discrim-
inatory election laws that would be best done away with altogether.
194. Id. at 7.
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ostensibly meant to address—namely, in-person voter fraud—and
reveal just how unlikely it is that an untrained, citizen challenger
will serve any useful purpose at the polls today.”195
In addition to not effectively preventing voter fraud, public voter
registration laws are overly restrictive means of preventing voter
fraud. There are other systems already in place that allow states to
confirm voter eligibility and prevent fraud without disclosing a
voter’s information to other members of the public.196 New regis-
trants’ voting applications are automatically verified by state voter
registration databases, and databases automatically check for exist-
ing voter file matches.197 Election officials also already employ a
variety of methods to maintain up-to-date voter rolls, including
cross-checking voter data with the DMV, the United States Post
Office, or National Change of Address files to identify voters who
have changed addresses or moved out of the state, receiving infor-
mation from the state department of health to identify deceased
voters, and receiving information from state courts to identify
mentally incapacitated voters and convicted felons.198
Many states also work together to maintain voter roll accura-
cy.199 As of September 2019, twenty-nine states participate in the
Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC), which helps
states keep voter rolls up to date by conducting data checks be-
tween states.200 ERIC processes voter registration data from mem-
ber states to create reports detailing voters who have moved within
the state, voters who have moved out of state, voters who have died,
and duplicate registrations in the same state.201 All of these mea-
sures effectively prevent voter fraud by confirming voter eligibility,
preventing duplicate registrations, and keeping voter rolls up-to-
date. And all of these methods do so without any need to disclose
voters’ personal information to the public.
195. Id.
196. See Voter List Accuracy, NCSL (Aug. 22, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-
and-campaigns/voter-list-accuracy.aspx [https://perma.cc/TDC3-RA4H].
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See Ensuring the Efficiency and Integrity of America’s Voter Rolls, ELEC.
REGISTRATION INFO. CTR., https://ericstates.org/ [https://perma.cc/45PK-LD2N].
200. Id.
201. See id.
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Public voter registration laws are also not substantially related
to improving the efficiency of administering elections. Administra-
tive efficiencies are achieved by internal state use of voter registra-
tion information (such as electronic databases and multistate use of
ERIC, as discussed above), but are not furthered by allowing public
access to this information. Election departments may be less
burdened by phone calls if individual voters are able to check their
registration status online before election day;202 however, “anony-
mous public access to all data in a record is not necessary to prepare
an individual voter for an election.”203 There are other, less intrusive
ways to inform individuals of their registration status and alleviate
demands placed on election departments. For example, voter reg-
istration websites could require individuals to take steps to verify
their identity before disclosing registration information.204 Voter
registration websites could also simply confirm or deny an individ-
ual’s registration status without disclosing other personal identify-
ing information contained in a voter’s file.205
Although the alleged state interests are important, these inter-
ests are not strong enough to justify the seriousness of the burden
imposed on citizens’ right to vote. Public voter registration laws
present serious barriers to registering to vote: citizens face the risk
of voter intimidation, physical safety threats, and identity theft, and
larger democratic and societal harms are incurred by the nation as
a whole.206
IV. THE DRIVER’S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT AS A MODEL FOR
REFORM
This Part proposes that Congress reform voter registration
laws to be modeled after the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of
1994, which limits the public disclosure of citizens’ DMV records.207
A similar law for voter registration information would restrict vot-
er information to internal state use unless a voter gives express
202. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
203. VOTER INFORMATION WEBSITES STUDY, supra note 140, at 17.
204. See id. at 19-20.
205. See id.
206. See supra Part III.B.
207. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2012).
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consent authorizing disclosure, and would include a statutory ex-
ception allowing disclosure for well-defined, limited uses.
Congress passed the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 in
response to some of the same privacy concerns raised by public voter
registration laws.208 The Act prevents a state DMV and any DMV
employee from knowingly disclosing or otherwise making drivers’
personal information available to any person or entity.209 The Act
grants a list of exceptions that driver records can be disclosed for,
which includes use by government agencies in carrying out their
functions, use by legitimate businesses for narrowly defined pur-
poses, and research activities “so long as the personal information
is not published, redisclosed, or used to contact individuals.”210
When a request is made for a driver’s information for any unautho-
rized purpose, the driver must waive their right to privacy in order
for the requesting person or entity to receive their information;
without a waiver, an individual’s DMV information will not be
released.211
A similar model for voter registration information would largely
eliminate the current harms imposed by public voter registration
laws and remove the barrier to voter registration. Preventing states
from disclosing voter information to private citizens and entities
would safeguard victims of domestic violence, stalking, and other
crimes from having their information obtained by another individ-
ual intending to cause them harm. This consent-based disclosure
model would also give privacy-conscious citizens control over the
dissemination of their information.
Some individuals who want to access voter information, such as
researchers,212 may object to this model of reform as overly restric-
tive. Recognizing the need for some access to voter information,
statutory exemptions can be granted for researchers, political
candidates, and political organizations.213 By drafting statutory
208. See supra Part III.B.2.
209. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a).
210. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1), (3), (5).
211. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(d).
212. See NCSL, supra note 9, at 3 (quoting an election researcher’s response to states
limiting voter information access: “I’m a researcher who studies voting trends to improve
elections—I need access to this information”).
213. See id. at 2-3.
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exemptions that authorize the use of voter information for legiti-
mate political purposes, voter intimidation can be minimized by
clearly and narrowly defining what constitutes a legitimate
“political purpose.”214 Disclosure exceptions should also contain the
requirement that voter information not be published or redisclosed,
so as to protect voters from physical safety threats and identity theft
risks, as well as improve voters’ confidence in the government’s
respect for and ability to safeguard their personal information.
By significantly reducing the harms resulting from public voter
registration laws, this proposed reform would remove privacy con-
cerns as a barrier to registering to vote, allowing more eligible
citizens to freely register and exercise their right to vote. This
reform comports with a fundamental ideal of privacy law, reflected
in the Privacy Act, that “if we must require our citizens and res-
idents to divulge information to the government to participate in our
society, we should protect that information from being used for
purposes other than the purpose for which data was first
required.”215
CONCLUSION
Public voter registration laws expose registered voters to voter
intimidation, physical safety threats, and identity theft risks, and
also impose larger democratic and societal harms on the nation as
a whole.216 The severity of privacy harms, although often considered
“easy to ignore” because they seem abstract or difficult to quantify,
should not be understated.217 A concerning attitude, infamously
expressed by Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy, is that “[y]ou
have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.”218 Discrediting privacy
concerns turns a blind eye to the growing incidences of real and
serious harms resulting from public information falling into the
wrong hands,219 and further disregards the fact that rapid changes
in technology promise to present new risks of significant privacy
214. See id. at 2.
215. Ohm, supra note 123, at 1160.
216. See supra Part III.B.
217. Ohm, supra note 123, at 1147.
218. Nehf, supra note 162, at 67.
219. See supra Part III.B.1-3.
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harms going forward.220 Viewed as a larger democratic and social
issue, not caring about privacy because one has nothing to hide is
akin to not caring about free speech because one has nothing to say.
Many citizens understand that privacy interests must be bal-
anced against other interests and benefits that result from readily
accessible information,221 however, no one should be required to
choose between their safety and security and exercising their right
to vote. “No right is more precious in a free country than that of
having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under
which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most
basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.”222 The right to
vote is simply too sacred to American citizens and the validity of
American democracy to restrict.
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